A downed Russian Shahed drone with a 4G modem connection via the Ukrainian cellphone network
Ukraine MoD
Cellphone networks have become a battleground in the conflict in Ukraine. In the latest move, Russians have started complaining that their mobile internet service is turned off at night. Both sides face a dilemma: limit phone services, or give the enemy an easy channel to direct precision drone strikes from long range. Other countries may soon face the same issue.
Drones With Phones
Both sides have been taking advantage of the adversary’s mobile phone system for drone communication. The technology is simple enough; all you need is a phone with a valid SIM card and something like DJI’s Cellular Dongle 2, a $150 gadget to fly your drone anywhere it can get a 4G phone signal. Like a walkie talkie, direct radio control of a drone is limited to a few miles, but using the cellphone system and you can be sitting in New York and flying a drone in Tokyo.
Operation Spiderweb was carried out using the cellphone system to communicate with FPV drones
Security Service of Ukraine
This type of remote control technology was used in the celebrated Operation Spiderweb attack in June, when the Security Service of Ukraine smuggled small FPVs close to five Russian airbases in trucks. The drones were launched and controlled via the Russian phone system, in a strike that destroyed at least ten strategic bombers and damaged many more.
Similar setups are being used wherever long-range communication is needed. Some Shahed drones, which were originally fire-and-forget cruise missiles, are now fitted with cameras and 4G cellular modems, allowing the operator to follow the drones’ progress and redirect it to avoid air defenses, or to guide it to a target.
The technology is also appearing at the lowest tactical level. The Russians have started using cheap Molniya fixed-wing drones as carriers, each transporting one or two FPVs through the belt of jamming at the front line and across to the other side. Jammers typically only have a range of a few hundred meters and are clustered around high-value targets. Fly over them and drones can operate freely.
This Russian Molniya drone act as a carrier for two small FPVs which can communicate at long range via LTE modems
Serhii Flash via Telegram
The Molniya releases its FPVs which connect to the operator via the Ukrainian cellphone service, allowing them to carry out strikes at ranges of 30 miles or more, far greater than normal control systems.
Meanwhile videos are regularly posted from Ukraine’s FP-1/2 long-range strike drones, suggesting that they too may be piggybacking on the commercial phone service, and this has prompted a Russian reaction.
Mitigation Measures
How do you stop enemy drones using your phone network? The Russians initially imposed a 24-hour ‘cooling off’ period on any phone which had used roaming services abroad. The block has now been extended to any SIM at all which has been inactive for 72 hours. The idea is to catch SIMs which have been bought in Russia and sent to Ukraine.
In some border regions the Russians are taking more extreme measures and shutting down the data service at night when most drone attacks occur, bringing complaints from subscribers.
Ukraine faces similar challenges. In June when the Shahed modems were discovered, electronic warfare guru Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov said he had been contacted by many people fearing that the service would be cut, but reassured them that “no one will turn off mobile communications throughout the country…it will be possible to call an ambulance or fire brigade or call loved ones.”
However he noted that measures were being considered, with the implication that while voice calls might be allowed, as in Russia, data services might be cut off in danger zones. (Older readers may recall though that sending digital signals across an audio channel is perfectly possible, though with reduced bandwidth).
Jammers Vs Phone IEDs
Western security agencies have already faced a similar challenge with the threat of IEDs detonated by a phone signal. In earlier times, radio-controlled devices to trigger bombs were complex, expensive and unreliable, but the cellphone age meant very little technical skill was required to rig up a device. In Iraq, the $30 Nokia 105 was a favorite triggering device among ISIS operatives.
The U.S. deployed radio frequency jammers to counter bombs detonated by mobile phone signals in Iraq and Afghanistan.
U.S. Marine Corps
US forces in conflict zones used jammers like Warlock to protect convoys from roadside bombs, and similar technology is available today to protect VIPs from similar attacks. The presidential motorcade includes several vehicles with conspicuous electronic warfare jamming antennas.
The use of such systems is tightly controlled. In the US cellphone jamming is only permitted by official agencies under specific circumstances such as Homeland Security operations. The Cellphone Jamming Reform Act also allows correctional facilities to block (contraband) cellphones within their bounds.
In general the concerns that the jammers will affect access to emergency services, and the operation of the emergency services themselves, currently tends to outweigh the benefits of jamming except in very high-risk situations with a known threat.
Defensive measures are likely to follow the Russian pattern of trying to identify and block rogue SIM cards. This might extend to locating SIM cards moving at high speed or high altitudes and preventing them from communicating.
However, things are only going to get more difficult. Some drones on both sides already have Starlink receivers and so are not reliant on the local phone system. This technology is becoming more accessible fast, with a number of providers demonstrating direct-to-satellite handsets which will work with the growing constellations of mini-satellites. This service is already available to some subscribers in areas where there is no phone signal from cellphone towers.
As satellite phone communication becomes universal, restricting or jamming use is likely to become more impractical. And hostile drone operators, from an adversary nation or terrorist group, can carry out precision attacks from the other side of the world.
Source: https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/12/05/russia-shuts-down-phone-networks-at-night-to-stop-drone-attacks/
