In March 2024, the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Commission raided an office compound in the municipality of Bamban, Tarlac, where they found almost 1,000 workers, including victims of human trafficking, who were part of a larger scheme of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operations (POGO) establishments in the country. 

A few meters from the compound lies the municipality hall of Bamban under then-mayor Alice Guo, also known as Guo Han Ping, who was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 2025 for qualified trafficking.

The case prompted a Senate inquiry by the Committee on Women, Children, Family Relations, and Gender Equality, revealing a web of organized crime and trafficking schemes that involved money laundering and financial scams through POGO operations. This reveals an alarming pattern of modern espionage in the Philippines and highlights the need to revisit the outdated Commonwealth Act 616, also known as the Espionage Act of 1941, which only punished offenders during wartime.

According to a Senate Committee Report dated February 2025, the proliferation of scam compounds suggests an emerging link between these POGO operations and Chinese espionage efforts.

What makes this pattern alarming is that espionage in the 21st century no longer resembles the traditional image of spies stealing military documents.

Modern espionage is embedded in business structures, digital infrastructure, financial systems, and even local politics. It is quieter, networked, and often hidden behind legitimate-looking enterprises.

Attractive terrain, outdated law

The Philippines, given its geography and alliances, has increasingly become an attractive terrain for intelligence operations. From northern Luzon to Palawan, locations near key military installations, ports, and critical infrastructure present strategic value to foreign actors seeking information and access. Surveillance of infrastructure, mapping of military facilities, and data collection on logistics and communications networks are now part of geopolitical competition.

This places the Philippines in what can be described as a strategic nodal position in the Indo-Pacific, situated along major sea lanes, near flashpoints in the West Philippine Sea, and host to expanded defense cooperation sites.

In such an environment, intelligence gathering is not an abstract threat but a persistent reality. The country’s geography, alliances, and economic openness make it both an important partner and a potential target for intelligence operations.

The problem is that the country’s main legal framework against espionage, Commonwealth Act 616, was written in 1941, long before cyber operations, drones, satellite communications, and digital financial systems existed. The law was designed largely for wartime espionage, not for peacetime infiltration conducted through corporate fronts, technology systems, or transnational criminal networks.

This legal gap creates vulnerabilities in addressing modern espionage methods, particularly those that operate in the gray zone between crime, business, and intelligence activities.

Reality check

This is where the proposed Senate Bill No. 33 becomes crucial. A modern anti-espionage law must address cyber-enabled espionage, unauthorized surveillance of critical infrastructure, the use of front companies for intelligence activities, and the recruitment or coercion of local assets. It must also strengthen counterintelligence coordination among government agencies and provide clearer legal tools for law enforcement and prosecutors.

Equally important is recognizing that national security today is not confined to military camps or intelligence headquarters. As the Bamban case demonstrated, vulnerabilities can emerge at the local level through business permits, land use approvals, and local political networks. This does not mean that every foreign business or foreign national is a security threat, but it does mean that the state must have the legal tools to act when economic activity becomes a cover for intelligence operations.

From Bamban to Palawan, the lesson is clear. The nature of espionage has changed, but the law has not. If the Philippines is to protect its sovereignty, critical infrastructure, and national security in an era of strategic competition, it must update its legal framework to match modern realities.

Passing a modern anti-espionage law is not about targeting any country or group. It is about protecting the Filipino people and the Philippine state in an increasingly complex security environment.

In today’s world, espionage does not begin with stolen documents. It begins with unnoticed patterns, weak regulation, and outdated laws. The question now is whether the country will adapt before the next Bamban-type case emerges, this time in a location even more strategically sensitive. – Rappler.com

Ralph Romulus Arias Frondoza is an independent strategy consultant and Resident Fellow at the International Development Security Cooperation, a Manila-based security and development think tank, specializing in geoeconomics, technology policy, and strategic risk. He finished his Master’s in International Studies at the University of the Philippines-Diliman.

Jose Mikhail Perez is a Resident Fellow at IDSC. He is an Assistant Professor and the former Chair of the Political Science Department of the University of the Philippines-Manila. He finished his Master’s in International Studies at the University of the Philippines-Diliman, specializing in intrastate conflict, foreign malign operations, and political research.