Why China Is Worried About Sanae Takaichi, Japan’s New Prime Minister

Japan’s political landscape has undergone one of its most dramatic shifts in decades which is set to change international politics. Newly elected Sanae Takaichi is now Japan’s first female new Prime Minister. Takaichi came to power after an unabashedly conservative campaign following the collapse of the 26-year coalition between Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party and its junior partner, Komeito. Komeito, a socially moderate and fiscally center-left party, was seen as a moderating force for the LDP, pulling it towards the center in foreign and fiscal policy. Takaichi pushed the LDP to the right in an alliance with several smaller conservative parties and movements, and in doing so has set the stage for a fundamental transformation of East Asian politics.

Takaichi’s rise has been watched with alarm in Beijing. Her reputation as a defiant hawk willing to entertain ideas of remilitarizing Japan precedes her and has seemingly rattled Beijing. Sino-Japanese relations are already often cold at the best of times, when Japan, due to the Article 9 of its post-World War II constitution, has renounced war and militarization as a means of resolving international disputes. With Article 9 now up for debate in Japanese society, and with it a fundamental reassessment of Japan’s role in the world, Takaichi’s premiership is set to strain relations with China and reshape the international system.

Who Is Sanae Takaichi?

If an unabashedly conservative, controversial, but nevertheless trailblazing female prime minister of an island nation with a constitutional monarchy who has expressed a penchant for economic liberalization and tactical remilitarization sounds familiar to you, it is because she has explicitly drawn inspiration from the U.K.’s Margaret Thatcher. Her economic agenda calls for aggressive fiscal expansion and a stronger domestic defense, fulfilling her broader vision of a more assertive Japan on the global stage.

As a former Minister of Economic Security and Internal Affairs, she has long been a prominent figure in Japan’s conservative camp. Her tenures as minister went well enough that her controversial agenda was not only vindicated, but she advanced up through the ranks of the LDP. She was also willing to court controversy when, during previous election cycles, Takaichi made headlines for her regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead. This explicitly includes over 1,600 convicted war criminals, including dozens of “Class A” war criminals, such as Hideki Tojo. These visits consistently sparked diplomatic protests from China and South Korea. Although she did not attend this year’s autumn festival, her history of participation remains a sore point for Japan’s neighbors.

Her foreign policy views, particularly toward China and Taiwan, have raised eyebrows in Beijing. Takaichi is a vocal advocate for revising Japan’s pacifist postwar constitution, expanding the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, introducing conscription, improving equipment for the JSDF, and strengthening ties with democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific. She has also publicly expressed interest in forming a security partnership with Taiwan, a move that would directly challenge Beijing’s “One-China” principle.

Takaichi and the Taiwan Question

Takaichi’s stance on Taiwan underscores Japan’s evolving security calculus. Japan has increasingly identified China as its primary security threat, a perception reinforced by tensions in the Taiwan Strait and China’s growing military presence in the East and South China Seas. Concurrently, erratic behavior out of Washington D.C. is making the Japanese establishment less confident in the reliability of the American security umbrella.

In a recent social media post, Takaichi called Taiwan a “cherished friend,” emphasizing the two countries shared “fundamental values, economic ties, and history.” For Beijing, those words were a red line. Chinese state media quickly responded, urging Japan to “abide by the political commitments” laid out in the 1972 Joint Communiqué, which normalized diplomatic relations between the two countries. Beijing’s response to her victory betrays its top-of-mind concerns with the new prime minister and provides insight into the issue that will define its relationship with the new administration.

Why Beijing Is Concerned

Takaichi’s political lineage traces back to the late Shinzo Abe, whose legacy continues to shape Japan’s security policy. Like Abe, Takaichi champions a vision of a more autonomous and militarily capable Japan, one less reliant on U.S. defense guarantees and less dependent on Chinese supply chains.

She has repeatedly criticized China’s military buildup and economic coercion, calling for tighter controls on critical technologies and deeper coordination with like-minded democracies.

In her interactions online with U.S. President Donald Trump, she has emphasized cooperation between the two nations to “advance a free and open Indo-Pacific region,” a subject that could see further exploration and specificity as the new Prime Minister prepares for a presidential visit only days into her term.

Beijing’s official statements thus far have been cautious, but Chinese academics and policy analysts have voiced growing anxiety. Some warn that Takaichi’s confrontational tone could trigger a cycle of escalation, hardening Japan’s alignment with the U.S. and Taiwan while increasing the risk of miscalculation.

The Road Ahead

China’s most significant concern lies in the Taiwan question. Takaichi has made clear that any “unilateral change to the status quo by force or coercion” is unacceptable—a statement widely interpreted as support for Taiwan’s autonomy.

If Tokyo, under Takaichi’s leadership, were to deepen military or intelligence cooperation with Taipei, it would mark a significant departure from Japan’s traditionally cautious approach. Such a shift could provoke a strong response from Beijing, ranging from diplomatic protests and economic pressure to intensified military signaling in the region. Japan has experience with this, such as when Japan endured China’s first utilization of cutting critical minerals exports in 2010, and it is thus unlikely Japan will be deterred.

A Takaichi premiership will almost certainly harden Japan’s posture toward China, testing the delicate balance that has defined Sino-Japanese relations since the 1970s. While both countries continue to emphasize stability in official exchanges, mutual suspicion runs deep, and under Takaichi, that gap may only widen. Alternatively, a hard-nosed foreign policy is not necessarily incompatible with productive diplomatic engagement and the cooling of tensions, as some of Takaichi’s idols like Thatcher and Reagan show. Clear lines and boundaries can provide new venues for productive dialogue compared with the current “strategic ambiguity” that prevails around Taiwan and the East China Sea. Regardless of the ultimate result, the land of the rising sun is about to make waves.