Ukraine Recaptures Kucheriv Yar, Exposing Flaws In Russian Strategy

On October 22, 2025, Ukrainian forces regained full control of Kucheriv Yar, a town in Donetsk Oblast that had been under Russian occupation since mid-August. The Air Assault Forces of Ukraine released drone footage on social media showing approximately 50 Russian soldiers surrendering. Additional videos show Ukrainian soldiers raising their national flag in the liberated town. The recapture of Kucheriv Yar is vital for Ukraine’s control of the region around the city of Dobropillia and is a major morale boost. Further, this victory highlights a fundamental weakness in Russia’s current offensive strategy, undermining its ability to hold captured territory.

Ukraine’s “Kill Zones” and the Defense of the Front Lines

After three and a half years of grueling attrition warfare, Ukraine’s defensive lines have become thin, stretched across roughly 1,000 km of contested territory. With limited personnel and equipment, Ukraine has been forced to prioritize defending certain sections of its lines, leaving other areas undermanned and underequipped. Even the reinforced sections are gradually being worn down by repeated Russian assaults.

Despite these shortages, Russian gains have been minimal, largely due to Ukrainian drones. Ukraine is rapidly producing new FPV and fiber-optic drones with increasing levels of technological sophistication. These drones have created “kill zones” in front of Ukrainian lines, where they patrol for advancing Russian forces. Upon detection, the drones either engage directly or relay target coordinates to artillery units. These kill zones have proven capable of stopping armored vehicles and large military formations.

Russia’s Ground Assault Strategy

While these kill zones are effective against larger mechanized formations, they are less effective against small groups of soldiers who are dismounted or using small vehicles such as ATVs or motorcycles. These forces are more difficult to detect and target, especially when moving through wooded or urban areas where drones have reduced capability. Engaging such targets also requires a large number of drones since they are spread out. As a result, most Russian assaults during their summer offensive have consisted of small bands of soldiers pushing through Ukrainian lines. These units have been primarily dismounted, though some have used motorcycles or ATVs for mobility. Once they move beyond the kill zones, they can directly engage Ukrainian forces, disrupt the defensive line, and potentially gain a foothold. These attacks, referred to as “meat waves” by the Ukrainians, have achieved limited success but at the cost of extremely high casualties.

This tactic proved successful in August when Russian forces managed to capture part of Kucheriv Yar. On August 11, 2025, Russian troops launched a ground assault from their salient northeast of Pokrovsk toward Dobropillia in Donetsk Oblast, aiming to exploit weaknesses in the Ukrainian defensive lines. As part of this offensive, Russian units broke through Ukrainian positions and advanced into Kucheriv Yar and Zolotyi Kolodiaz, moving roughly ten kilometers and establishing temporary footholds in these towns. However, it is unclear the Russian assault forces they ever gained full control of the town, and by August 14 Ukraine reported that its forces had stabilized the front after deploying reinforcements. Even so, a Russian unit remained in Kucheriv Yar attempting to defend its foothold.

The Flaw in Russia’s Approach As Shown In Kucheriv Yar

Russia’s current tactics follow the attrition-based approach adopted earlier in the war. In this strategy, Russia is willing to sacrifice large numbers of soldiers in frontal assaults to create gaps in Ukraine’s defenses that can later be exploited for larger gains. Although this results in heavy losses, it leverages Russia’s ability to absorb casualties through its larger military and ongoing mobilization efforts.

Despite this, the approach has produced only limited gains, and Russia has not been able to capitalize on them. When Russian assaults succeed in taking territory from Ukrainian forces, they must quickly shift to a defensive posture to hold it. These defensive positions are often established in settlements, which are easier for small dismounted units to defend. However, these positions remain behind the Ukrainian kill zones, which continue operating after the assaults. Furthermore, once Ukraine identifies where Russia is attacking, it can concentrate drone resources to strike reinforcements and supply lines entering the area.

As a result, Russian units are left operating in small, isolated pockets. Russia is unable to adequately reinforce or resupply these units, preventing them from expanding their initial gains. Reports from across the front indicate that many of these units are running low on essential supplies, including water, food, and ammunition. Over time, the lack of resupply and reinforcements renders these forces combat ineffective and severely damages morale, as seen in Kucheriv Yar, where Russian troops eventually surrendered.

Strategic Implications For The War

Ukraine’s recapture of Kucheriv Yar is likely the first of many such pockets to surrender, especially as it continues to publicize these successes. Although Russia has made some progress during its summer offensive, it is unlikely to hold those gains. Just as Russian minefields limited Ukraine’s counteroffensive in 2023, Ukraine’s use of drones to create kill zones has effectively countered the current Russian advance, preventing it from consolidating captured territory.

More broadly, the recapture of Kucheriv Yar is another example of Ukrainian drones compensating for other shortcomings on the battlefield. At the start of the war, the TB2 Bayraktar played a key role in disrupting the initial Russian offensive. Since then, the widespread use of Ukrainian FPV and fiber-optic drones has helped offset Russia’s advantages. As the war continues, if Ukraine maintains this edge in drone warfare, Russia will continue to find only limited success in its offensive operations.