[OPINION] The South China Sea code: Can the Philippines seal the deal as ASEAN Chair in 2026?

The South China Sea (SCS) has long been a flashpoint for regional tension and great power rivalry because of its strategic location as a shipping route, generating an estimated $5.3 trillion worth of commercial goods annually, as well as its richness in marine life and natural resources.

Unfortunately, the Philippines is at the center of a looming geopolitical storm in the SCS due to China’s coercive and unlawful actions, on top of the failure of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finalize a legally-binding Code of Conduct (COC) over the last decades. The region has since lived with ceremonial dialogues, diplomatic declarations, and half-baked agreements that put the waters and its resources towards an irreversibly militarized, exploited, and unsustainable path.

Since the maritime arena is becoming more turbulent beyond abstract news headlines, there is now a sense of urgency to chase after an implementable framework that actually reduces risks and protects the rights of coastal states.

For the Philippines, 2026 may finally be the key to change the narrative and step up its leadership game. 

The country’s ASEAN Chairship next year, which President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. publicly inaugurated on November 14, presents the ultimate chance to set acceptable behavioral standards in this high-stakes maritime issue and steer the ship to the region’s favor. Therefore, next year cannot just become a symbolic aspiration without a concrete strategy to end the long-standing legal debate and reconcile divergent interests.

Supported by the legal clarity of the 2016 Arbitral Award and reinforced by growing international support, the Philippines’ renewed sense of optimism must be geared towards giving its leaders the political vigor to institutionalize meaningful confidence building measures.

However, converting expectations into results as a display of real commitment to finalize the COC will soon be tested as the world watches with a thousand skeptical questions. Can the Philippines secure both ASEAN and China’s signatures on a binding document meant to govern one of the most consequential maritime areas in the world?  Or will it rely on the same diplomatic routine of symbolic gestures, and just let threat actors ensure that no one writes the rules on the South China Sea, much to the region’s disadvantage?

How the COC benefits the region 

Let us address these questions by identifying first how the COC benefits the region. To start, the COC serves as a security blanket for the region against the threat of China’s illegal and aggressive activities in the South China Sea, including harassment of military officers, fisherfolk, and marine scientists. It reduces tensions and minimizes the likelihood of any escalation, misunderstanding, or miscalculation in the disputed waters. 

The COC also builds communication, trust, and confidence among countries. While it is not a guarantee of resolving the territorial disputes instantly, the agreement is an opportunity to foster good working relations among ASEAN member states and China, encouraging them to act with self-restraint and cooperate in critical areas such as marine environmental protection, research, and search and rescue operations.

The stability that comes with having a COC also provides significant economic gains for ASEAN member states and the region as a whole, as it helps ensure that critical sea lanes are secure and the flow of global trade passing through those waters is not disrupted. In addition, the region becomes more secure for foreign investors to invest and conduct business. 

What hinders the COC’s realization 

All these advantages can only be achieved once the COC is agreed upon by all parties. But even after more than two decades since the first ASEAN declaration on the South China Sea was created, no document has ever been finalized because of several challenges.

There are still ongoing debates on the geographical scope of the COC. For the Philippines and another claimant, Vietnam, the scope of the COC must include all disputed areas in the South China Sea. For China, it must only include the areas where it does not have complete control of, or in other words, the features it has yet to militarize and occupy.

There is also the challenge of identifying whether the COC is binding or not. Of course, it is not unexpected that China would want a non-binding document for flexibility and to achieve personal gains and interests. China’s unwillingness to accept and recognize the 2016 Arbitral Award ruling signals this position. 

The inclusion of external powers is also being contested. This pertains most particularly to the United States, which is a treaty ally of the Philippines and a strategic rival of China. While the Philippines and other like-minded states benefit from US presence in the Indo-Pacific, China does not want any US involvement as it believes that the South China Sea disputes is a regional issue that must be resolved by states within the region alone.

Another challenge is the institutional flaws of ASEAN as a regional organization. Why is ASEAN silent about the illegal activities perpetrated by China against the Philippines in the latter’s own territory? Why is ASEAN silent about the fact that a major power is threatening regional security and stability? Its consensus model of decision-making leads to a lack of unified position in regional security concerns, especially traditional security challenges. Varying positions on issues of key importance also stem from each ASEAN member state’s relations with the US and China as major powers, which includes political leanings and economic dependence, thereby influencing decision-making.

The last challenge is the impending deadline for a COC document. Is it really feasible for the COC to be finalized next year? If and when this document is concluded and both ASEAN and China have reached an understanding, will the COC function the way it is intended to? Or will it be just another document filled with commitments and grand statements that will never be implemented in reality? With the desire to reach the 2026 deadline, it is possible that the COC becomes a mere document that falls short of expectations.

What the Philippines can do 

With all that has been discussed, we go back to the central question: Can the Philippines seal the deal in 2026? If so, how?

In the Philippines’ goal of concluding the COC during its ASEAN Chairship, the country must be clear about its strategic goal for the COC. It must prioritize the settlement of issues that hinder the completion of the COC by appealing to ASEAN first so the regional organization can present a unified voice at the negotiation table.

The Philippines may also develop its strategic communications plan related to the COC to communicate its relevance to various actors such as the Filipino public, claimant countries in the South China Sea, like-minded partners, and even countries beyond the region. The country will also benefit from continuing to develop its defense capabilities on maritime domain awareness, cyber defense, and other operational capabilities. 

Finally, the Philippines should engage with China strategically and critically considering that China is a co-actor in the conclusion of the COC. Priority areas of cooperation may include economic, environmental, and disaster response to generate a more-accepted response from China. The Philippines must also carefully navigate the complexities of ASEAN member states’ relations with China and ensure that the terms included in the COC promote regional cooperation rather than further division. 

As the Philippines takes the helm of ASEAN in 2026 as Chair, it must therefore steer the regional organization towards making significant progress in realizing a rules-based and actionable code of conduct to effectively navigate relations in the South China Sea and finally achieve the regional stability it has long aspired for. – Rappler.com

Sabrina Carlos, Christine Castillo, and Alexia Anne Sunaz are inaugural fellows of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Philippines’ Women in Security Programme.