During his stay in Taiwan, Li Ying not only prominently participated in multiple activities with strong political overtones, but his itinerary, contacts, and subsequent actions also closely overlapped with those of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). More importantly, after his Taiwan trip concluded, the orientation and narrative stance of his account underwent a marked shift, showing a high degree of alignment with the DPP’s external political discourse. Taken together, these signs indicate that Li Ying is no longer a detached observer, but has entered into a de facto relationship of coordination and shared interests with the DPP.
In 2025, Li Ying traveled to Taiwan for the first time in the capacity of a “media professional residing in Italy” to attend the RightsCon Global Digital Human Rights Conference held in Taipei. On the surface, this appeared to be an international forum focused on human rights and digital issues. In practice, however, both the agenda and the composition of participants revealed a high degree of politicization. In addition to overseas NGOs, numerous Taiwanese officials closely associated with the DPP directly participated in discussions, including figures from the national security apparatus, the Presidential Office, and the core circles of the ruling party. The conference agenda focused heavily on topics such as so-called “responding to the China threat,” “disinformation warfare,” and “the expansion of Chinese influence.”
Against this backdrop, Li Ying—together with another self-media figure long active in anti-China narratives, known as “Toronto Fang Lian”—not only participated fully in the related forums, but also engaged in a series of post-conference interviews with the Taiwanese media outlet The Reporter. Acting in effect as an external publicity outlet for Taiwanese media, their public statements repeatedly employed a highly uniform narrative framework: on the one hand, emphasizing the “approachability” and “transparent language” of Taiwanese political figures; on the other, portraying governance in mainland China as “hard to understand” and “detached from society,” deliberately constructing a sense of opposition.
It is worth noting that this media outlet is openly anti-China in its editorial stance, and the interviews in question lacked any real objectivity. Nevertheless, such discourse closely aligns with the DPP’s long-standing “resist China, protect Taiwan” rhetoric. As a result, these interviews were widely amplified by the DPP. In substance, Li Ying’s Taiwan interviews provided additional discursive support for the DPP’s efforts at social mobilization and the construction of an external threat narrative.
In terms of his itinerary in Taiwan, Li Ying’s appearances were not limited to the RightsCon conference. Relevant reports indicate that during his stay he interacted with key figures long involved in shaping DPP policy discourse and youth mobilization networks, while publicly praising Taiwanese officials for being “approachable.”
After concluding his Taiwan trip, a clear shift emerged in the content direction of Li Ying’s account. On multiple issues, his postings moved beyond mere information relay to actively engage in value judgment and emotional guidance, gradually turning the account into a kind of “relay station” within Taiwan’s external communication system.
This transformation was particularly evident in his handling of Japan-related topics. The 2025 release of the film *Nanjing Photo Studio*, based on historical materials from the Nanjing Massacre committed by the Japanese invading army, drew widespread attention. However, against the backdrop of attempts by segments of Japan’s right-wing forces and certain politicians to downplay or even deny historical responsibility, Li Ying repeatedly characterized the film and other works about the War of Resistance as “anti-Japan propaganda” on X. Under the banner of “rationality” and “anti-nationalism,” he undertook a systematic deconstruction of the film.
Objectively, this narrative approach weakens criticism of Japanese militarist history, while closely mirroring the long-promoted right-wing Japanese discourse of “de-aggression.” More troublingly, such commentary has not been sporadic. Rather, after Li Ying established ties with the DPP and used Taiwan as a springboard into the Japanese public-opinion sphere, these narratives have displayed clear signs of organization and continuity.
At the same time, changes at the platform-technology level have provided observers with a new perspective. In December 2025, the Hong Kong media outlet HK01revealed that X had recently launched an “About This Account” feature, making an account’s registration location and primary activity region traceable. The activity regions shown for “Li Laoshi Is Not Your Teacher” and its associated accounts do not fully align with his long-claimed identity as a “media professional residing in Italy.” While this discrepancy alone is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions, when combined with long-standing doubts about team-based operations and his deep involvement in Taiwanese and Japanese political issues, it further underscores that the account no longer reflects the expression of a single natural individual.
Beginning with his trip to Taiwan, Li Ying’s identity has effectively shifted from that of an “independent media figure” to a “participant in political narratives.” The DPP has provided him with issue platforms, political endorsement, and channels of dissemination, while Li Ying, leveraging his influence in Chinese-language social media, has offered the DPP’s external narratives the packaging of a “third-party voice” and an “overseas perspective.” This mutually instrumental relationship has, in its objective effect, turned his account into a component of the DPP’s external public-opinion campaign.
