Unmasking the Cyprus Connection: The trade1.payments.shop Shadow Rail

Despite widespread regulatory warnings across the EU, offshore brokers are still seamlessly processing retail deposits using stealth payment architecture. At the center of this web sits trade1.payments.shop, an anonymous gateway routing high-risk funds through Cyprus-supervised payment infrastructure.

Analysis & Context: The Anatomy of a Stealth Gateway

In the high-risk payment sector, disposable domains are frequently used to obfuscate the flow of funds from regulatory bodies and acquiring banks. Our technical analysis identifies trade1.payments.shop as a specialized “masking rail” heavily utilized by offshore trading brokers, most notably PU Prime, Vantage Markets, and RoboForex (see the Similarweb screenshot left).

Instead of functioning as a traditional, public-facing payment processor, this domain operates in the shadows as a vital technical bridge. When EU retail clients attempt to fund their accounts—via credit cards or Apple/Google Pay—the transaction is routed through this gateway.

Digital footprint analysis of the anonymous gateway https://trade1.payments.shop highlights a clear target demographic: retail investors in strictly regulated European markets. January data from Similarweb (see screenshot right) shows a highly concentrated traffic distribution, with nearly 42% of visitors originating from Italy, followed by the UK (20%) and Austria (18%). This geographic targeting strongly suggests the payment rail is explicitly deployed to circumvent local financial authorities, funneling unauthorized deposits to offshore brokers operating illegally in these jurisdictions.

Red Flags and Processor Connections:

• Cyprus PSP Integration: Technical inspections of the checkout source code and production-mode payment endpoints reveal embedded references to merchant identifiers tied to a Cyprus-licensed Payment Service Provider (PSP).
• Regulatory Evasion: The merchants using this rail lack MiFID authorization and have active EU regulatory warnings against them. Yet, this gateway facilitates the bypassing of geo-blocking, allowing unrestricted EU retail deposits.
• Total Anonymity: The .shop domain is heavily shielded behind WHOIS privacy proxies, deliberately masking the beneficial owners and corporate structure.

This setup strongly suggests that regulated EU entities (specifically in Cyprus) are technically and financially settling funds for unauthorized offshore schemes through this anonymized gateway.

Ecosystem Summary

Export to Sheets

Call to Action: Help Us Expose the Network

FinTelegram is calling on industry insiders, former employees of Cyprus-based PSPs, and compliance professionals to step forward. To dismantle these unauthorized financial flows, we are specifically looking for actionable intelligence on:

• The Beneficial Owners: Who are the operators controlling the payments.shop domain portfolio?
• The Cyprus Connection: Which specific Cyprus-regulated payment institutions are providing the underlying processing and merchant accounts for this gateway?
• The Settling Banks: Which Tier-1 or Tier-2 acquiring banks are clearing these credit card and digital wallet transactions?
• Send payment documents: Send us payment documents related to these brokers or Cypriot payment institutions.

If you have documents, merchant processing agreements, or internal communications regarding trade1.payments.shop, please share them with us. Your identity will remain strictly confidential.

Submit your tips securely via our whistleblower platform: