The nearly four-decade-old 1987 Philippine Constitution could not be clearer in calling on Congress to complete its work — ensuring that its open-ended provisions are fully realized as our nation continues its journey toward a more democratic and inclusive society. Yet one of its most consequential mandates remains unfulfilled: the clear and unequivocal prohibition of political dynasties.

Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution provides that “The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.” The intent is unmistakable. Dynastic concentration of power is incompatible with equal political access. The Constitution delegated to Congress the responsibility to define the prohibition. Four decades later, that responsibility remains unmet. 

From the 8th to the 19th Congresses — both the House of Representatives and the Senate — legislative efforts to regulate political dynasties have been stalled, diluted, or quietly buried at the committee level. Reform advocates — often a minority of progressive Senators and Representatives — have been consistently outnumbered by legislators whose influence is sustained by dynastic lineage. The result is not mere delay of the law but an enforcement vacuum–one that has allowed dynastic politics to normalize despite an explicit constitutional directive.

The issue resurfaces at the end of every Congress and after every election cycle, when calls to end political dynastic rule are routinely invoked to court voters, often framed as promises of reform and democratic renewal. Yet once elections are over, many of the same politicians retreat from these commitments, choosing political survival over principle and prioritizing political persistence over public service. Some go even further, entrenching themselves in power by forming dynasties of their own. Over time, this cycle of promise and inaction has transformed what the Constitution treated as a democratic pathology into a normalized feature of political life.

Consolidation of power

More troubling still is how both old and emerging dynastic politicians have expanded their reach beyond political control into economic dominance. What we are witnessing and experiencing is no longer mere political entrenchment, but the consolidation of power across multiple spheres. In some cases, dynastic actors have diversified their instruments of control by abusing state resources, private wealth, and entrenched political machinery to secure public office, suppress opposition, and accumulate greater influence. 

It is important to emphasize that the constitutional prohibition against dynasties is fundamentally a democratic reform measure, not merely economic in nature. Its objective is to institutionalize fair political competition and equal access to public service. Economic distortions, although real and consequential, are palpable consequences of political concentration.

Empirical research underscores the urgency of reform. Dynastic dominance has shown how it systematically undermines electoral competition. Candidates from political families benefit from inherited name recognition, established campaign machinery, and durable local networks that influence voter mobilization and campaign finance. These advantages are cumulative and intergenerational. They raise entry barriers for non-dynastic candidates and reduce the effective contestability of public office. In many localities, elections function less as open contests and more as mechanisms of familial succession. 

These democratic distortions have measurable governance implications. Provinces dominated by political dynasties exhibit higher poverty incidence and greater income inequality compared to non-dynastic provinces. Dynastic dominance has been known to lead to weaker performance such as in infrastructure, health outcomes, employment generation, and legislative initiative. Dynastic persistence in electorally secure districts is associated with diminished legislative initiative, as weakened electoral competition reduces incentives for performance and responsiveness. These findings suggest that the harms of political dynasties are structural rather than merely personal.  

This structural understanding is crucial for addressing one of the most persistent counter-arguments that “some dynasties are good.” The prohibition does not rest on the assumption that all dynasts are corrupt or incompetent. It rests on the recognition that dynastic dominance distorts political competition regardless of individual merit. Even those effective and capable leaders benefit from inherited advantages unavailable to equally capable but non-dynastic citizens. 

Some need reminding that democracy is not designed to depend on the benevolence of powerful families. It is designed to ensure fair access to power.

At present, only a small number of public officials remain genuinely committed to fulfilling this Constitution’s decades-old promise of ending dynastic rule. Notably, some members of political families themselves have expressed support for anti-dynasty legislation — an acknowledgement that reform is both necessary and overdue. Yet the challenge today extends beyond traditional dynasties. Contemporary political clans have evolved into highly adaptive networks. They do not merely rotate candidacies, distribute offices among relatives, or maintain control through successive and simultaneous officeholding; they also deploy dummies and proxy candidates who advance and safeguard dynastic interests. 

Without comprehensive and carefully designed regulation, dynastic power will not disappear; it will simply reorganize and evolve. Political clans may comply formally with narrow prohibitions in form while preserving substantive control by placing relatives in overlapping constituencies or alternative electoral pathways, including the party-list system.

Safeguard of democracy 

Recent legislative developments, however, demonstrate that reform is neither impossible nor legally untenable. The passage of the Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of 2015 marked a significant—albeit limited—step toward addressing the problem of political dynasties by incorporating relationship-based disqualifications in youth governance. A similar reform can be found in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, where the Electoral Code prohibits nominees of parliamentary parties from being related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity. These measures demonstrate that familial relationship-based electoral regulations can be clearly defined, administered, and enforced within the Philippine legal system. 

Beyond these reforms, parallel proposals have emerged seeking to modernize and democratize the electoral system, strengthen the Commission on Elections, and curb elite capture of the party-list system. Yet their limited scope underscores the continuing absence of a comprehensive national policy addressing dynastic concentration across all levels of government.

This persistent cycle of posturing, neglect, and legislative inaction underscores a central democratic truth: passing an anti-political dynasty law is no longer a matter of discretion. It is a constitutional duty. The continued failure to enact enabling legislation has produced a sustained gap between constitutional principle and political practice that has allowed dynastic dominance to expand, adapt, and entrench itself across the political system.

Contrary to claims that it is anti-democratic, regulating political dynasties is, in fact, a safeguard of democracy. True democratic choice presupposes not only the availability of candidates but reasonably fair conditions of political competition. When inherited political machinery systematically discourages challengers and monopolizes access to office, voter choice becomes formally open but substantively limited. Regulation aimed at reducing entrenched structural advantage expands rather than restricts democratic participation.

Comparative democratic practice supports this logic. Democracies around the world impose guardrails excessive concentration of political power — through term limits, campaign finance regulations, and anti-nepotism measures. These mechanisms do not curtail rights; they protect democratic institutions by ensuring that power remains open, contestable, and accountable.

As the Philippines confronts persistent political, social, and institutional challenges, Congress can no longer afford the comfort of delay. Upholding the rule of law — and affirming that Philippine democracy is not merely procedural but genuinely substantive — now demands decisive action. Enacting an anti-political dynasty law would be among the most consequential steps Congress could take to honor the Constitution and give real meaning to its promise of equal access to public service.

Four decades of inaction are enough. Democracy cannot survive on constitutional text alone—it must be institutionalized, enforced, and lived. Implementing the anti-dynasty provision is not only a legal or constitutional duty; it is a moral, political, and democratic necessity.

Arjan Aguirre is an Assistant Professor (currently on study leave) at the Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University. He is completing his PhD in Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, USA. He is also a member of the Anti-Dynasty Network (ADN). Jess Paul Pasibe is an Instructor at the Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University, and he is a core group member of the Anti-Dynasty Network.