[OPINION] What to do with Filipinos spying for China

Four columns are advancing on Madrid from each one cardinal points, but the victory will be given to us by the fifth column, that already is inside.
— attributed to Nationalist General Emilio Mola during the Spanish Civil War

Fifth Column – A clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation’s solidarity by any means at their disposal. 
— definition from Britannica 

Recently, Rappler released an exclusive investigative series about a number of cases of Filipinos who were caught spying for China. The operations against these individuals involved a number of government agencies and the military. What is of concern is that several of them are employees of not just any government agency but the Department of National Defense (DND). Another spy was able to secure information for the Chinese from personal contacts he has with members of the Philippine Coast Guard.

Much has been made about the apprehension of these Filipinos spying for China. Though it is indeed an accomplishment by the Marcos administration, it however also raises a number of questions, such as: How did the Chinese manage this level of penetration into the Philippine government? Why, despite China’s threat to the Philippines, have authorities been late in addressing the issue of Chinese-sponsored and directed espionage against the country? 

Furthermore, if one is to assess these counterespionage achievements of the government, these are at best tactical victories. The intelligence transmitted by these Filipino spies is tactical in nature, such as ship deployments. Also, these spies are low-level foot soldiers that the Chinese can afford to lose and are in fact easy to replace. The Chinese at this point have correctly assessed that, with corruption and factionalism rampant in the Philippines, it will not be difficult to recruit another Filipino spy who is willing to sell out their own country regardless of any existing or future proposed law penalizing espionage. This is corroborated by the findings of government authorities that financial reasons was the driver for these Filipinos to decide to work for the Chinese. 

A RAPPLER EXCLUSIVE

• Chinese operation taps Filipinos to access top security info
• Threats within: Filipino spies in denial
• The price of stealing Philippines’ top security secrets
• Why PH needs a modern anti-espionage law

Policies reversed under Duterte

In the first place, these things should not have happened. The intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities of the Philippine national security and defense sector, if properly used, is actually one of the best in the world. Consider the fact that, years before 9-11, the Philippine government had passed on to their American counterparts intelligence obtained from terrorists that hinted at those attacks. During the War on Terror that followed 9-11, government authorities were successful in disrupting many foreign terrorist activities in the Philippines. 

On the assumption of the Aquino administration in 2010 and following the Bajo de Masinloc/Scarborough Shoal Standoff in 2012, strategies and policies were drawn up to decisively deal with China’s alarming and steady encroachment into the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). That administration assessed Chinese territorial ambitions as the primary security threat to the country — an existential one that could end the existence of the Philippine Republic as a viable socio economic and political entity more than any other internal or external threat. In tandem with bringing China to court for its illegal activities, the Aquino administration established an interagency effort to improve Philippine defenses and roll back whatever inroad China had been making in the country. 

So, from that, how did the Philippines end up with employees of the DND on the payroll of the Chinese years later? It is because the Duterte administration happened in 2016 and, in an act that could be considered outright betrayal of the country, saw to the prompt dismantling of all efforts to contain the Chinese.

Rodrigo Duterte’s first target was to trash the victory over China garnered by the Philippines in the International Tribunal. He belittled it and did not follow it up with a campaign that should have mobilized the Filipino nation and further isolated China in the international community for its actions in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

Equally outrageous was his policies of defeatism and of sweeping under the rug Chinese harassments of Filipinos in the EEZ of the Philippines that continued despite his slavishness towards Beijing. Duterte was so successful in disrupting the campaign of the previous administration to contain China that it resulted in paralysis and indecision in the lower levels of the Philippine government when it came to facing Chinese aggressive acts.

There were so many public and military officials who supported the Philippine position in the WPS during the Aquino administration who either became silent or, worse, started trumpeting the supposed benefits of Duterte’s pro China policy. From containment and rolling back China under Aquino, the Philippines under Duterte opened up to Chinese intrusion with no one in government effectively monitoring whatever negative effects it would have on the country. 

To avoid running afoul of Duterte’s pro-China policy and his hostility towards the United States, many in the security sector tried to keep under wraps bilateral activities that they conducted with the Americans. In one shameful incident, the Philippine military tried to restrict media from covering the 2018 Balikatan Exercises but reversed themselves when some Filipino military officers and the Americans protested. Equally shameful was that some units of the Philippine military involved in civil relations and social media even produced output that denigrated the efforts of those Filipinos resisting China’s aggression against the Philippines.

The author even experienced an incident wherein, as the curatorial consultant of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Museum, he tried to propose an exhibit on the Philippine historical position on the Kalayaan Island Group and West Philippine Sea, only to be met with indecision from the military official he was discussing it with. In short, the exhibit never materialized as no decision was made on it for fear of upsetting higher ups in the administration.

So the Philippines endured six years of that destructive and defeatist pro-China policy of Duterte that further weakened the country instead of strengthening its resolve against the threat. To think that when the earlier Pnoy administration drew up its campaign against China, the consensus was that time was running out for the Philippines and it had to act decisively and forcefully. Then Duterte came in and wasted six years, thus forcing the succeeding Marcos administration to start from Square 1 all over again and patch up all the damage done. That explains all the current delays and belated efforts in the counter-espionage campaign. 

What is to be done?

As mentioned, the achievement of apprehending the spies may amount to just pinpricks in the greater order of things in the country. Threats continue to fester in the Philippines not only because of corruption, but also because of the tendency of the authorities to sit on piles of evidence against prominent personalities and choose to ignore it, and instead go after those at the lower levels. Capturing low-level spies does have the appearance of progress in the campaign, but these are not decisive blows that will effectively cripple espionage or the march of China’s Fifth Column. 

The campaign then gets subordinated to politics because of the untouchable nature of those who openly sabotage programs of the government aimed to defend against China. It then creates a climate of impunity that encourages many other Filipinos to sell their services to Beijing. This is why strategic victories will be achieved only by dealing with those at the top, and effectively cripple the efforts of China to turn Filipinos against each other.

The spies for China may have been reduced, but the pro-Beijing politicians are still there and are unscathed with their corrosive poison still spreading. These politicians can possibly transmit national security secrets of the Philippines to the Chinese. They can also influence and dictate policy if they increase in number and recapture the presidency.

It is no secret that the Duterte camp is openly supportive of China, thus creating for Beijing a bottomless well of potential recruits to penetrate all aspects of Philippine life. All it takes is for a pro-China president to sit in Malacañang in 2028, and everything accomplished to advance Philippine interests in the WPS will immediately come crumbling down. By then, the current successes of the WPS awareness campaign, the passage of anti-espionage laws, and the apprehension of low-level spies — will not matter anymore. – Rappler.com

Jose Antonio Custodio is a military historian who also dabbles in national security and defense commentary. He sometimes teaches and has authored articles and co-authored books on military history. He is an unabashed ailurophile, an unrepentant bibliophile, and an avid scale modeler.