Tough journey ahead on managing problems in the Strait of Hormuz — Phar Kim Beng

JUNE 19 — The postponement of the planned United States-Iran talks in Switzerland on June 19 is a reminder that diplomacy in West Asia remains fragile even after the recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) that temporarily halted direct hostilities.

The MOU was signed by President Donald Trump at the G7 Summit, alongside the EU, and witnessed by leaders from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain barely two days ago in France.

What was supposed to be the beginning of a more structured process toward stabilising the region – based on the 14 points in the MOU – has instead become another illustration of how difficult it will be to move from ceasefire to genuine peace.

The immediate trigger for the cancellation was the renewed violence involving Israel and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.

While Washington and Tehran may have agreed in principle to reduce tensions, neither controls all the actors capable of reigniting conflict across the region.

The result is that diplomacy remains hostage to events on the ground.

For the global economy, however, the larger issue lies not in Switzerland but in the Strait of Hormuz.

Even if future negotiations resume, the reopening of Hormuz is proving far more complicated than many policymakers initially assumed.

According to recent maritime assessments, approximately 80 naval mines remain uncleared in and around critical shipping lanes.

As a consequence, normal commercial traffic cannot resume immediately despite the political understanding reached between Washington and Tehran.

This is a sobering reality.

Political agreements can be signed in a matter of days.

Clearing sea mines, restoring insurance confidence, re-establishing shipping schedules, and persuading tanker operators to return can take months.

The Strait of Hormuz is not merely another maritime corridor.

Historically, around one-fifth of global oil flows and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas exports have passed through this narrow waterway.

When traffic through Hormuz slows, the consequences ripple through energy markets, shipping costs, inflation rates, and supply chains across Asia, Europe, and beyond.

For Asean, the implications are immediate.

Most Southeast Asian economies are heavily dependent on imported energy.

Singapore serves as a major refining and trading hub.

Malaysia remains an energy producer but is also deeply integrated into regional energy networks.

Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines are all vulnerable to sustained disruptions in oil and gas markets.

A partial reopening of Hormuz should therefore not be mistaken for a return to normality.

The current situation resembles a highway that has technically reopened after a major accident but remains littered with debris.

Traffic may move, but it does so slowly, cautiously, and at higher cost.

Reports indicate that ships are being forced to use alternative routes and less optimal navigation channels.

Maritime operators remain concerned about residual mines, navigational interference, and uncertainties regarding future Iranian policies toward shipping access.

Hundreds of vessels continue to face delays across the Gulf region.

This suggests that energy volatility is likely to remain with us for some time.

For Malaysia and Asean, three lessons stand out.

First, strategic petroleum reserves become more important than ever.

Asean has discussed regional energy security for years, but the Hormuz crisis demonstrates why collective stockpiling mechanisms deserve renewed attention.

Second, diversification of energy sources must accelerate.

The transition toward renewable energy is often discussed in environmental terms.

Yet the Hormuz crisis shows that renewable energy is equally a matter of strategic resilience.

Third, Asean should continue supporting diplomatic efforts involving all major powers while avoiding entanglement in rival blocs.

The region’s prosperity depends on stable sea lanes and predictable energy markets rather than geopolitical confrontation.

The cancellation of the Switzerland talks should therefore not be interpreted as the collapse of diplomacy.

Switzerland has already indicated its willingness to host future discussions, and both Washington and Tehran still have strong incentives to prevent a return to full-scale conflict.

Yet neither should Asean assume that the crisis is over.

The mines remain in the water.

The shipping risks remain real.

The tensions in Lebanon remain unresolved.

The broader nuclear issue remains unsettled.

And trust between the United States and Iran remains exceptionally thin.

The path ahead is therefore likely to be long and uneven.

Diplomacy may have prevented a wider regional war for now.

But restoring confidence in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints will require far more than diplomatic declarations.

It will require painstaking technical work, sustained political commitment, and, above all, the successful clearance of the roughly 80

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia and director, Institute of International and Asean Studies.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.